War Powers: The Operational Code of Competence by Reisman, W. Michael
1989] CONSTITUTION IN ITS THIRD CENTURY: FOREIGN AFFAIRS
In summary: the War Powers Resolution, as it has operated, is not faithful
to its stated purposes. It has not been conducive either to decisive confron-
tation or to cooperation between the branches. This failure owes something
to a congressional misperception of what legislation can accomplish. Laws
cannot be self-executing in the sense of compelling the Executive or, for that
matter, the Congress to carry their purpose into operation. When a law
requires the President to act in accordance with established procedures and
criteria, four institutions are available to buttress the law's mandate and to
urge compliance: the Congress itself, the judiciary, the Treasury and public
opinion. Each of these has some persuasive capability, yet each is difficult to
mobilize in a crunch. Clarity and simplicity of legislated standards and
automaticity of legislated procedures are the means by which Congress may
yet persuade the President to rely more on consultation and codetermina-
tion and less on "thaumaturgic invocation."
WAR POWERS: THE OPERATIONAL CODE OF COMPETENCE
By W. Michael Reisman*
Wholly apart from the questions of whether and under what circum-
stances major coercion is permissible under international law and whether
minor coercion, including threats, is lawful, there is a broad and deep
national consensus that the United States should continuously develop a
military capacity sufficient for a range of contingencies and maintain it in a
state of readiness.' The consensus has been far less certain with regard to
who will decide, and how, to initiate and use this capacity, at varying intensi-
ties. The original terms of the Constitution have been invoked by partisans
of opposing views,2 but debate in those terms has proved inconclusive.
Behind the legal bickering, a complex, but unstated, operational code' has
* Wesley N. Hohfeld Professor of Jurisprudence, Yale University; Board of Editors. The
author acknowledges contributions of Myres S. McDougal, Andrew R. Willard and Allison M.
Zieve.
' See, e.g., National Security Act of 1947, 10 U.S.C. §133(a) (1982) (readiness status of
NATO military forces); 10 U.S.C. §3012(b)(I) (maintenance and preparedness of army); 10
U.S.C. §8012(b)(1) (maintenance of air force); 50 U.S.C. §401 (1982).
"See, e.g., E. V. Rostow, "Once More unto the Breach": The War Powers Resolution Revisited, 21
VAL. U.L. REV. 1, 3-7 (1986); R. TURNER, THE WAR POWERS RESOLUTION: ITS IMPLEMEN-
TATION IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 16-18 (1983); T. REVELEY, WAR POWERS OF THE PRESI-
DENT AND CONGRESS 170-75, 227-28 (1981); Franck, After the Fall: The New Procedural
Framework for Congressional Control over the War Power, 71 AJIL 605, 607-08 (1977); Koh, Why
the President (Almost) Always Wins in Foreign Affairs: Lessons of the Iran-Contra Affair, 97 YALE L.J.
1255 (1988).
By operational code is meant a set of norms that operate in a certain sector and that actors
deem to be authoritative even though the norms may be inconsistent with formal legal codes.
The operational code is normative but is inferred from past practice and projections of future
trends, rather than from documents alone. See generally W. M. REISMAN, FOLDED LIES (1979);
W. M. REISMAN & A. WILLARD, INCIDENTS: THE LAW THAT COUNTS IN INTERNATIONAL
POLITICS (1987).
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developed, allocating competence to initiate, direct and terminate different
types of coercion among the branches. Parts of the operational code are
clear and relatively stable over time. Other parts are less certain and can be
projected only with qualifications, reservations or contingencies.
Understanding the distribution of war powers is a practical and urgent
matter. Allies and adversaries must know when and how each will respond to
which events if common defense and reciprocal deterrence are to be effec-
tive. Symbolic uses of force-like conspicuously changing the level of alert,
sending a wing of fighter-bombers to a beleaguered country, positioning an
AWACS, or conducting joint or separate maneuvers or war games-are
standard pieces in the political repertory, used as protest or warning, for
conservation, deterrence or expansion of power. The effectiveness of these
symbolic uses of force depends on credibility. For democratic governments,
credibility depends in key part on whether the internal process is, and is
believed to be, capable of making good on commitments.
I propose to examine, first, why the entire matter has proved intractable;
second, what the contents of the code are; and third, the extent to which the
operational code that has emerged meets contemporary constitutional re-
quirements.
I. WHY THE PROBLEM CONTINUES
Lack of Clarity in the Original Scheme
The general U.S. constitutional technique of checks and balances was
designed to limit, if not disable, the federal Government. Power was
checked and balanced by dividing functions among the different branches.
Foreign affairs functions were centralized in the federal Government and
their various sequential components were distributed among the branches.4
The President is the commander in chief of the war-making mechanism.-
The competence to initiate its plenary use, and thus to engage the nation in
the activity, is assigned to Congress.'
The Constitution speaks only of "war," 7 not mentioning the range of
lesser coercion involving the symbolic or actual use of armed farce. The
document is unclear as to whether the Framers intended the word "war" as
a generic term for all purposive violence or whether they understood that
the commander in chief would retain independent competence to initiate
and engage in coercion short of war.
Radical Contextual Changes
The conditions that prevailed in 1789 have changed radically, with re-
gard to the United States, the world and the U.S. role in it. Foreign relations
generally and armed conflict in particular play a so much greater and more
4 See U.S. CONST. Art. I, §8, cls. 1, 3, 11; id., Art. I, § 10; id., Art. II, §2; id., Ari. III, §2. See
THE FEDERALIST Nos. 48 (J. Madison), 51 (A. Hamilton orJ. Madison), and 73 (A. Hamilton).
5 U.S. CONsT. Art. II, §2. 6 d., Art. I, §8, cl. 11.
7
1d.
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continuous role in domestic life that even if the tacit interbranch arrange-
ments forged in the 18th and 19th centuries had continued, executive
power would still have been aggrandized at the expense of the other
branches.
Nuclear weapons have decisively changed military reality and interna-
tional relations. Chemical, biochemical and bacteriological weapons may
push the changes further in the next century. Until 1945, wars could be
anticipated and prepared for, national debates could be conducted or, at
least in the case of the two world wars, public opinion could be prepared.
Hiroshima ushered in the era of the "come as you are" war. Because wars
could start and end quickly, actions aimed at staving off widespread conflict
might have to be taken rapidly. Thus, military technology transformed the
world arena from one of episodic to permanent militarization, with vast
competing organizations maintaining an infrastructure of vigilant, plane-
tary-wide surveillance, rapid positioning and deployment, and continuous
weapons research and development, all in an increasing spatial arena.8
Domestically, war, instead of a periodic evanescent episode in American
life, became a continuing political, psychological and financial preoccupa-
tion, with a claim to defer or depreciate in varying degree other key rights
and liberties. Because foreign affairs was invading and subordinating do-
mestic affairs, whoever called the tune in foreign affairs increasingly called
it in domestic matters.9 The increasing interdependence of nations and,
hence, the permeability of the line supposedly dividing domestic from inter-
national political issues came to mean that every policy and every strategic
option had discernible and substantial impact on different domestic regions
or interest groups.
When the War Department was renamed the Defense Department, 10 the
change was more than nominal. The entire sector was growing and becom-
ing institutionalized in an unprecedented way. Henceforth, parts of the
defense establishment, now planning and pre-positioning on a global scale,
would insist on operating with a high degree of "security." Coordinately,
the "intelligence community" began to develop its own operational capac-
ity. In short, more governmental entities, with their own security concerns
and bureaucracies, began to involve themselves in the regular planning for,
and use of, force in international politics.
National interests became global. Industrial and science-based civiliza-
tions, incorporating large numbers of interdependent states, required as-
sured access to vital materials, some found only in areas beyond national
control. Every part of the planet was assigned some geo-military and geo-
economic valence. In this calculus, changes in political control over even
distant parts of the planet suddenly became critical for domestic economic
vigor and national military security.
For background, see Reisman, Private Armies in the Global War System: Prologue to Decision, 14
VA. J. INT'L L. 1 (1973); McDougal, Reisman & Willard, The Effective Power Process, 21 U.C.
DAVIS L. REv. 807 (1988).
See Manning, Congress, the Executive and Intermestic Affairs, 55 FOREIGN AFF. 306 (1977).
' See National Security Act of 1947, 10 U.S.C. §§131-133 (1982).
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Neither the United Nations Charter nor the nuclear stalemate stopped
the use of force in international politics. Under the nuclear umbrella, big,
long wars may be the exception; but the actual and symbolic use of force is
more common than ever. "Resort to armed force," Lord McNair lamented,
"is widespread and constant, but none dare call it 'war'.""n The nuclear
weapons in reserve limit the extent of political change and, in an unexpected
way, make the world "safer" for conventional war. Ironically, this situation
hastened the obsolescence of the literal allocation of war powers under the
Constitution; for if actors were less and less likely to declare wars, they were
more and more likely to use force, in one form or another. Foreign policy
decisions, many ultimately turning on the intense use of force, came to be
made continuously, and often rapidly and discreetly or secretly.
National Constitutive Changes
When lawyers study the American political system through time, they
tend to adopt as their frame of reference the Constitution, a document
describing the creation of a set of institutions in 1789. Even adding the
plethora of agencies that have since been formally appended, one still re-
ceives an incomplete picture of the actual processes of the national commu-
nity that establish and maintain the fundamental institutions for making
decisions: the constitutive process.'
2
The document of 1789 does not account for such things as the extraordi-
nary growth of national, regional and local media as a factor shaping popu-
lar perceptions of what is occurring and whether or not it is right. The
growth, independence and influence of this estate coincided with a break-
down of the reciprocal restraints practiced by the federal Government and
the media in earlier periods of national crisis. National party structures,
which were an effective technique for maintaining discipline within the
legislative branch, have also eroded. The possibilities of a bipartisan foreign
policy once depended upon party leaders capable of keeping party members
in line. That capacity has decayed. Nor does the 1789 document take ac-
count of the continuing high degree of effectiveness of business interests in
American politics and the operation of bureaucratic dynamics generating
departmental interests and competition.
Unprecedented demographic and political changes in the United States in
the last century and, in particular, changes in the cohesion of the national
elite now permit more and more groups with highly focalized interests to
influence national policy. The composition of the foreign policy elite in the
United States, once a relatively small regional group shaped by an intense
process of acculturation, has also been diffused over the past half-century.
One result is a less coherent conception of national interest. All of these
developments are facilitated by the ideology that national interest is not a
consistent, rational and objectively verifiable collective choice but a self-
"A. McNAIR, THE LEGAL EFFECTS OF WAR, at vii (4th ed. 1966).
12 McDougal, Lasswell & Reisman, The World Constitutive Process of Authoritative Decision, in
M. S. McDOUGAL & W. M. REISMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAw ESSAYS 191 (1981).
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generating chorus, constituting and organizing itself, without direction,
from its members' discordant shouts of self-interest.
Aggravation of Interbranch Relations
A constitutional common law developed early with regard to the use of
force short of war. The President used the military instrument at his dis-
posal in a variety of settings in which war had not been declared and for
which the Senate or Congress as a whole had not voted specific authoriza-
tion 3 (much as the President developed a parallel agreement-making pro-
cedure that bypassed the Senate 4 ). Congress, as a whole, rather than being
an obstacle and competitor to the Executive's expanded role in foreign
policy, was often accommodating and compliant.15 That trend was matched
and validated by the judiciary.
16
After World War II, this de facto accommodation, which had suffered
episodic stresses, began to disintegrate, with a series of abortive war powers
resolutions,"1 increasing congressional efforts to assert control over agree-
ment making,'" and more direct intervention in diplomatic protection. 9
Congress, for example with regard to Cuba in 1962, sometimes urged a
reluctant or vacillating Executive to apply force short of war.2° During the
Vietnam War, the weakening of party discipline at the national level and the
disintegration of a bipartisan foreign policy exacerbated divisions between
'R. TURNER, supra note 2, at 23-32.
"See McDougal & Lans, Treaties and Congressional-Executive or Presidential Agreements: Inter-
changeable Instruments of National Policy, in M. S. McDOUGAL & ASSOCIATES, STUDIES IN
WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 404, 412 (1987).
" Since and including the landmark case of United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.,
299 U.S. 304 (1936), most of the cases reviewed by the Supreme Court in which a purported
violation by the Executive of congressional power over foreign affairs took place were not
initiated by Congress (which apparently would have let the matter pass), but by private parties
(who felt that their interests were prejudiced and whose lawyers deemed it tactical to frame the
violation in constitutional terms). See, e.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S.
579 (1952); Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 997 (1979); Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S.
654 (1981).
" See, e.gJapanese Whaling Ass'n v. American Cetacean Soc'y, 478 U.S. 221 (1986); Dames
& Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981); Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280 (1981); Goldwater v.
Carter, 444 U.S. 997 (1979); Chicago & S. Air Lines v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103
(1948); United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942).
17 See debates on S. Res. 99, 82d Cong., 1st Sess., 97 CON. REC. 2539, 2571, 2589, 2644,
2652, 2736, 2739, 2769, 2845, 2851, 2862, 2871, 2903, 2910, 2938, 2966, 3008, 3041,
3056, 3062, 3076, 3144, 3161, 3254 (1951); see also H.J. Res. 9, 82d Cong., 1st Sess., 97
CONG. REc. 34 (1951); S. REP. No. 129, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969); 115 CONG. REC. 17,245
(1969) (National Commitments Resolution).
" See S.J. Res. 130, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. (1952); S.J. Res. 1, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. (1953); S.J.
Res.73, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. (1953); S. REP. No. 412, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. (1953) (Bricker
Amendment).
' See, e.g., Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations
Act, 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-202, tit. II, §§542,569,570,577, 101 Stat. 1329, 1342-44, 1365,
1373-74, 1379-80 (1987).
'" G. ALLISON, ESSENCE OF DECISION: EXPLAINING THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS 194-95
(1971).
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Congress and the Executive. Although U.S. participation in that conflict was
authorized by a theoretically rescindable2 1 congressional resolution,
22
members of Congress became concerned by what they saw as an erosion of
their power in international relations. It is no surprise that this period
witnessed the enactment of both the War Powers Resolution 2 3 and the
Case-Zablocki amendment,24 which purported to narrow asserted execu-
tive powers in, respectively, use of force and agreement making. These
developments occurred at the nadir of executive-congressional relations in
this century. The War Powers Resolution was passed within weeks of the
"Saturday Night Massacre, "25 without which it might well have fared no
better than its predecessors.
Even in its early and relatively vigorous years, the Resolution proved to be
narrower in practice26 than envisaged. Successive administrations have
resisted it,28 and the Supreme Court has cast doubts on the constitutionality
of one of its fundamental mechanisms.
29
II. THE OPERATIONAL CODE OF WAR POWERS
The operational code allocating competence to use force abroad is com-
plex and opaque in places. The code is unstable because each Executive
continues to insist on broad, independent competence to use force as it feels
events require, while Congress insists on what it deems its prerogatives. But
23 Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, Joint Resolution of Aug. 10, 1964, H.R.J. Res. 1145, 88th
Cong., 2d Sess., 78 Stat. 384, repealed byAct ofJan. 12, 1971, Pub. L. No. 91-672, § 12,84 Stat.
2053.
22 See, e.g., The War Powers Act: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 93d
Cong., 1st Sess. 23-25 (1973) (Statement of Nicholas deB. Katzenbach); see alo STAFF OF
SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 91ST CONG., 2D SEss., DOCUMENTS RELATING TO
THE WAR POWER OF CONGRESS, THE PRESIDENT'S AUTHORITY AS COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF
AND THE WAR IN INDOCHINA 1-7 (Comm. Print 1970) (Statement of Nicholas deB. Katzen-
bach in opposition to National Commitments Resolution).
23 50 U.S.C. §§1541-1548 (1982). 24 1 U.S.C. §112b (1982).
2 5 See T. EAGLETON, WAR AND PRESIDENTIAL POWER 213-20 (1974).
21 Unlike the Constitution, the Resolution refers to force in broad terms, to include "assign-
ment of members of such armed forces to command, coordinate, participate in the movement
of, or accompany the regular or irregular military forces of any foreign country or government
when such military forces are engaged, or there exists an imminent threat that such forces will
become engaged, in hostilities." 50 U.S.C. §1547(c) (1982). The legislative history indicates,
"The word hostilities was substituted for the phrase armed conflict. H.R. REP. No. 287,
93d Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1973).
27 Phillip Zelikow has compiled from public records 44 instances of the use of -rmed force
abroad by the United States from 1975 to 1982, 88% of which, he concluded, had favorable
outcomes in relation to the objectives of the U.S. decision makers. In the same period, the War
Powers Resolution was invoked nine times, of which only five involved types of incidents for
which it was intended.
2
1 See Executive statements reporting on uses of force, reprinted in U.S. NAVAL WAR COL.
LEGE, THE 1973 WAR POWERS RESOLUTION: LAW AND PRACTICE, Tab D; Glennon, The War
Powers Resolution Ten Years Later: More Politics than Law, 78 AJIL 571, 572-75 (1934).29 INS v. Chadha, 402 U.S. 919 (1983).
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practically, Congress cannot be consistent. Congress has to endorse and
possibly applaud executive actions that it feels are sound, or that succeed, or
that enjoy popular support, which creates precedents and undermines its
position for those occasions when it actively opposes an executive action.
The following propositions reflect, in my view, the expectations of effec-
tive actors, domestic and foreign, about the way national competence to use
force is distributed.
1. War, in its traditional international legal and constitutional sense, may
only be declared by Congress. The operational code assigns preponderant
power to the Executive for the initiation of action but, in comparison with
the past, somewhat greater power to Congress in its implementation and
termination.
2. Reactive nuclear war is a matter of presidential competence. Ambi-
guities as to what is reactive and what proactive-e.g., an increase to a high
level of alert, which itself heightens risk-will enhance executive compe-
tence.
3 0
3. Other overt military actions short of national war are matters of initial
presidential competence, subject to a condition subsequent: continuing con-
gressional political support.
4. As regards low-level, protracted ground operations requiring re-
peated congressional allocations, Congress will enjoy broader power in de-
fining their scope, somewhat less in their termination and virtually none in
their initiation. There will be more consultation between the Executive and
Congress, but it may not qualify as "consultations" under the War Powers
Resolution and the influence it actually allows will be difficult to gauge.
5. Military maneuvers designed to convey commitment to allies or con-
tingent threats to adversaries-e.g., repositioning part of the fleet, symbolic
visits of a wing of fighter-bombers, interposition of AWACS or a manifest
increase in alert level- are matters of presidential competence. Congress
does not appear to view as within its bailiwick many low-profile contempo-
rary expressions of gunboat diplomacy, i.e., the physical interposition of
some U.S. war-making capacity as a communication to an adversary of
United States' intentions and capacities to oppose it. For constitutional
comity, however, the Executive will make a point of notifying and consult-
ing congressional leaders in most cases.
6. In the wider constitutive process, the public's attention span and toler-
ance vis-a-vis uses of military force, short of a massive attack on U.S. terri-
tory, will be directly proportional to the loss of American lives in the action,
factored by its duration. For reasons that are obscure, ground commitments
will be less tolerable than naval commitments.
7. Courts will steer clear of future war powers confrontations, which will
be resolved politically.
" See generally P. BRACKEN, THE COMMAND AND CONTROL OF NUCLEAR FORCES (1983).
Even proponents of strong congressional competence acknowledge the President's competence
in the strategic area. See, e.g., Franck, supra note 2, at 607-11. Rostow has criticized Franck in
this regard but is not persuasive. Rostow, supra note 2, at 48-50.
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8. This new constitutive regime will have a discernible limiting effect on
the tactical choices available to the military.3 One alternative to this limit,
developed by President Nixon and Secretary Kissinger, adopted belatedly
by President Carter and refined by President Reagan, has been proxies.
(The Imperial Government of Iran, for example, operated as a proxy for
the United States; its collapse indicates the inherent dangers of the scheme.)
Not all potentially effective proxies will prove acceptable in domestic
politics."
9. Executive programs to mount larger mobilizations and involvements
may be facilitated by and may capitalize on accidental variables: external
precipitating event(s), e.g., Pearl Harbor and the more trivial, but emotion-
generating, Gulf of Tonkin affair. However, even when the popular temper
is outraged by a dramatic act of violence, the injunction of haste under the
sixth proposition above will hold. The longer an action persists, the more
time there will be for opposition to mobilize and drain support, undermin-
ing the executive-initiated national effort.
10. Executive explanations to the rank and file are likely to become
simpler, even to the point of being ludicrous. Part of this may be attribut-
able to the contemporary media, which tend to simplify and shorten com-
plex and technical issues.
11. Lack of clarity in the allocation of competence and the uncertain
congressional role will sow uncertainty among those who depend on U.S.
effectiveness for security and the maintenance of world order. Some reduc-
tion in U.S. credibility and diplomatic effectiveness may result. Alliance
patterns will adjust accordingly.
III. DOES THE OPERATIONAL CODE
MEET CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENTS?
The contemporary constitutional challenge is to design or adapt institu-
tions so that decisions about the initiation and use of coercion can be made
in ways consistent with contemporary realities and historical political values.
Values pertinent to this problem involve representativeness, power sharing,
responsibility, effectiveness, prudence and timeliness.
Key provisions of the operational code appear inadequate in terms of
these values. First, executive international effectiveness appears to have
been appreciably, although not disastrously, reduced. Foreign elites often
try to use Congress to deflect the Executive from a policy on which it is set.
Trends in the application of the War Powers Resolution may be viewed not
"' See A. Roach, A Navy Lawyer's View of the Military's Experience Under the War Powers
Resolution, Remarks at the Seventh Annual Seminar of the Center for Law and National
Security, University of Virginia School of Law 7, 9 (Sept. 23, 1988).
32 Argentinian officers could be used directly in Nicaraguan contra operations, but South
African troops could not be used in Angola. See Argentina Linked to Rise in Cover. U.S. Actions
Against Sandinistas, N.Y. Times, Apr. 8, 1983, at Al0, col. 3; Abandon Angola to Russia?, U.S.
NEws & WORLD REP., Feb. 23, 1976, at 35; Angola: Dangers that Accuse Congress, id., Dec. 29,
1975, at 19.
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only as communications to the President but also as messages to adversaries
that persistent resistance will be rewarded rather quickly. Forceful action by
the executive branch may be blunted within a relatively short time span by a
Congress with its own foreign policy."
Second, these changes influence the planning of uses of force. Planning of
visible, ground-based uses of force abroad must incorporate the probability
of severe time limits, no matter how urgent and valid the national interest.
Alternative, short, intense, high-level actions may not always be the most
economical or rational. The military also assumes that its adversary studies
and targets domestic political processes, hoping that changes precipitated
there will bleed support and ultimately force a change of tactics and/or
policy.
Third, responsibility suffers. The institutional capacity for continuous
focus on key, interrelated foreign affairs issues in immediate and larger
contexts is comparatively smaller in Congress, increasing the probability of
shortsighted decisions that will prove damaging in the long term. Interna-
tional law may suffer. Even proponents of enhanced congressional foreign
affairs powers have been dismayed by Congress's cavalier disregard of inter-
national law in recent matters such as UN assessments34 and host country
obligations.3 5
Finally, and ironically, national representativeness may actually be re-
duced. Debates about war powers are frequently cast as a contest between a
democratic Congress and an imperial President, the latter often conflated
with a hereditary monarch on the order of George III. But in the contempo-
rary constitutive process, the President is elected at 4-year intervals by the
entire nation, largely on the basis of foreign affairs positions. The House of
Representatives, whose members are chosen on local issues by subcompo-
nents of states and, thanks to financing by political action committees, re-
elected at an astonishing 98 percent rate, 6 could well be less nationally
representative in foreign affairs than the President, who is limited to two
terms and frequently turned out after the first.
IV. CONCLUSION
A review of the operational code confirms a complex reallocation of war
powers, with significant implications for the United States, as well as the rest
of the world. Should the code prove ill-tooled for its tasks, the constitutive
process will review it in the course of its third century, as it has in the
previous two.
" Thus, U.S. News & World Report stated that a "radio message between two Moslem militia
units" said, "If we kill 15 marines, the rest will leave." Marines Draw a Beard on Snipers, U.S.
NEws & WORLD REP., Oct. 31, 1983, at 13.
4 See United Nations Organizations Reform in Budget Procedures, 22 U.S.C. §287e note
(Supp. IV 1986).
"' See, e.g., Anti-Terrorism Act of 1987, 22 U.S.C.A. §§5201-5203 (West Supp. 1988).
3h 46 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 3206 (1988).
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NUCLEAR WAR POWERS
By Peter Raven-Hansen*
As the Constitution enters its third century, its framework for the exercise
of war powers is under siege. Presidential exercises of war powers to repel
attacks, rescue lives, protect property, retaliate and threaten have posed the
most persistent and visible challenge to that framework. But an equal theo-
retical challenge is posed by a power that the President has used only twice,
the nuclear war power.' Part I of this essay describes that challenge. Part II
evaluates the constitutionality of the existing distribution of nuclear war
powers. Part III identifies-but does not explore-alternatives.
I.
The contours of the original constitutional war powers framework are
well-known.2 The Framers conferred on Congress the power to decide war
or peace by formal declaration or other authorization. They also recognized
that the decision may be made for us by an enemy attack creating a state of
general war and a threat to the national security that the President must
repel without awaiting congressional authorization. In either case, they
vested the command of the armed forces in the President, acknowledging
the efficiencies of a single commander in chief. Finally, they left Congress
both the antecedent control of establishing and regulating the forces that
the commander in chief has to command and the subsequent control of
appropriating funds for their continued support in the field. At a time when
the nation had no standing army, pre-positioning of military forces took
weeks or months, and military stockpiles were too small to sustain forces in
the field for long, these controls assured that Congress would hold the reins
on the dogs of war.
The development of nuclear weapons has turned this framework on its
head. The existing stockpile of nuclear weapons can incinerate the earth
several times over. They are already pre-positioned, in that land-based mis-
siles can be delivered on target in 30 minutes, and submarine-based missiles
in even less time.3 The combination of these characteristics-vast destruc-
tive potential and speed of delivery-can bring us precipitately to what
National Security Adviser Scowcroft calls "the automatic phase of war,"
* Professor of Law, George Washington University National Law Center.
'See generally FIRST USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS: UNDER THE CONSTITUTION, WHO DE-
CIDES? (P. Raven-Hansen ed. 1987) [hereinafter WHO DECIDES?]; NUCLEAR WVEAPONS AND
LAW, pt. II (A. Miller & M. Feinrider eds. 1984); Goldstein, The Failure of Constitutional Controls
Over War Powers in the Nuclear Age: The Argument for a Constitutional Amendment, 40 STAN. L.
REV. 1543 (1988); Miller & Cox, Congress, the Constitution and First Use of Nuclear Weapons, 48
REv. OF POL. 211 and 424 (1986).
2 See, e.g., L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 50-54, 80-81, 100-08
(1972); W .T. REVELEY, WAR POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS (198 1); A. SOFAER,
I WAR, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND CONSTITUTIONAL POWER: THE ORIGINS, ch. 1 (1976); Lof-
gren, War-Making Under the Constitution: The Original Understanding, 81 YALE L.J, 672 (1972).
3 See, e.g., D. FORD, THE BUTTON 132 (1985),
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